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Abstract— This paper studies communication scenarios
where the transmitter and the receiver have different objectives
due to privacy concerns, in the context of a variation of
the strategic information transfer (SIT) model of Sobel and
Crawford. We first formulate the problem as the minimization
of a common distortion by the transmitter and the receiver
subject to a privacy constrained transmitter. We show the
equivalence of this formulation to a Stackelberg equilibrium of
the SIT problem. Assuming an entropy based privacy measure,
a quadratic distortion measure and jointly Gaussian variables,
we characterize the Stackelberg equilibrium. Next, we consider
asymptotically optimal compression at the transmitter which
inherently provides some level of privacy, and study equilibrium
conditions. We finally analyze the impact of the presence of an
average power constrained Gaussian communication channel
between the transmitter and the receiver on the equilibrium
conditions.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper studies communication scenarios where the
transmitter and the receiver have different objectives due to
privacy concerns of the transmitter. Consider, for example,
the communication between a transmitter and a receiver,
where the common objective of both agents is to minimize
some objective function. However, the transmitter has an ad-
ditional objective: Convey as little (accurate) information as
possible about some privacy related information- correlated
with the transmitted message- since the reconstruction at the
receiver is reported into databases visible to other parties
(government agencies, police, etc.). Obviously, the receiver
is oblivious to this objective, i.e., privacy is not a common
goal. Then, what kind of transmitter and receiver mappings
(encoders and decoders) yield equilibrium conditions? How
do compression at the transmitter or the presence of a noisy
channel impact such equilibria?
Such problems where better informed transmitter com-
municates with a receiver who makes the ultimate deci-
sion concerning both agents have been considered in the
economics literature under the name of “cheap talk” or
strategic information transfer (SIT), see e.g., [1], [2] and
the references therein. The SIT problem[1], involves settings
where the private information, available only to the trans-
mitter, affects the transmitter utility function. The receiver
utility does not depend on this private information and thus
is different from that of the transmitter. The objective of
the agents, the transmitter and the receiver, is to maximize
their respective utility functions. One of the main results
of [1] is that, all Nash equilibrium points can be achieved
Authors are with the Coordinated Science Laboratory, University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1308 West Main Street, Urbana, IL 61801,
USA {akyol, langbort, basar1}@illinois.edu
This work was supported by AFOSR MURI Grant FA9550-10-1-0573.
by a quantizer as a transmitter strategy. Here, motivated by
the conventional communication systems design, we analyze
the Stackelberg equilibrium [3], where the receiver knows
the encoding mappings and optimizes its decoding function
accordingly. This fundamental difference between the two
problem settings enables in the current case the use of
Shannon theoretic arguments to study the fundamental limits
of compression and communication in such strategic settings.
In [4], the set of Stackelberg equilibria was studied for
estimation with biased sensors. Here, we study the communi-
cation and compression with privacy constraints in the same
context.
The privacy considerations have recently gained renewed
interest, see e.g., [5], [6], [7] and the references therein. In
[8], [9], Yamamoto studied a compression problem similar
to the one considered here: find an encoder such that there
exists a decoder that guarantees a distortion no larger than
DC when measured with ρC and at the same time cannot be
smaller than DP , when measured with ρP in conjunction
with any other decoder. In [7], Yamamoto’s result was
extended to some special cases to analyze the privacy-utility
tradeoff in databases.
In this paper, we explicitly study the equilibrium condi-
tions under transmitter’s privacy constraints. The contribu-
tions of this paper are:
• We first formulate the problem, that involves minimiza-
tion of a global objective by the encoder and the decoder
subject to a privacy constraint measured by a different
function.
• Assuming an entropy based privacy measure and
quadratic distortion measure, we characterize the
achievable distortion-privacy region with or without
compression at the transmitter.
• We study the impact of the presence of an average
power constrained Gaussian communication channel on
the privacy-distortion trade-off.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
Let R and R+ denote the respective sets of real numbers
and positive real numbers. Let E(·) denote the expectation
operator. The Gaussian density with mean µ and variance
σ2 is denoted as N (µ, σ2). All logarithms in the paper are
natural logarithms and may in general be complex valued,
and the integrals are, in general, Lebesgue integrals. Let
us define S to denote the set of Borel measurable, square
integrable functions {f : R→ R}. For information theoretic
quantities, we use standard notations as, for example, in
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Fig. 1. The problem setting
[10]. We let H(X) and I(X;Y ) denote the entropy of a
discrete random variable X(or differential entropy if X is
continuous), and the mutual information between the random
variables X and Y , respectively.
B. Setting-1: Simple Equilibrium
We consider the general communication system whose
block diagram is shown in Figure 1. The source X and
private information θ are mapped into Y ∈ R which is fully
determined by the conditional distribution p(·|x, θ). For the
sake of brevity, and with a slight abuse of notation, we refer
to this as a stochastic mapping Y = g(X, θ) so that
P(g(X, θ) ∈ Y) =
∫
y′∈Y
p(y′|x, θ)dxdθ ∀Y ⊆ R (1)
holds almost everywhere in X and θ. Let the set of all
such mappings be denoted by Γ (which has a one-to-one
correspondence to the set of all the conditional distributions
that construct the transmitter output Y ).
The receiver produces an estimate of the source Xˆ through
a mapping h ∈ S as Xˆ = h(Y ). An inspector observes
the estimate of the receiver, aims to learn about the private
information θ, i.e., minimize H(θ|Xˆ). Note that the joint
statistics of the random variables is common knowledge.
The common objective of the transmitter and the receiver
is to minimize end-to-end distortion measured by a given
distortion measure ρC as
DC = E{ρC(X, Xˆ)} (2)
over the mappings g, h subject to a privacy constraint:
E{ρP (θ, Xˆ)} ≥ JP (3)
over only the encoding mapping g (the decoder is obliv-
ious to the privacy objective). Here, the encoder aims to
minimize DC in collaboration with the decoder (classical
communication problem). The encoder has another objective,
however: to maximize privacy, measured by, say ρP or to
guarantee that this privacy is not less than a given threshold,
say JP ∈ R+. Note that the decoder has no interest in finding
out this information, or in satisfying or not satisfying this
constraint. This subtle difference, i.e., the fact that there is
a mismatch between the objectives of the decoder and those
of the encoder, motivates us to consider this problem in a
game theoretic setting (the SIT problem). In game theoretic
terms, we consider a constrained Stackelberg game where
only one of the players (the encoder) is concerned with the
constraint in (3). Here, the encoder knows that the decoder
will act to minimize the global cost DC . Hence, Player 1
(leader) is the encoder and it knows that Player 2 (follower,
the decoder) acts to minimize DC . The leader (the encoder)
acts to minimize DC subject to (3) knowing the decoder’s
objective. In the following, we present this optimization
problem formally:
Problem 1: Find g(·, ·) ∈ Γ which minimizes
E{ρC(X,h∗(g(X, θ)))}
subject to
E{ρP (θ, h∗(g(X, θ)))} ≥ JP
where
h∗(g) = argmin
h∈S
E{ρC(X,h(g(X, θ))}
In this paper, we specialize to quadratic Gaussian set-
tings, i.e., the source and the private information are jointly
Gaussian, the distortion measure is mean squared error and
the privacy measure is conditional entropy. Particularly, this
setting implies that (X, θ) ∼ N (0, RXθ), where RXθ =
σ2X
[
1 ρ
ρ r
]
; without loss of any generality we take ρ ≥ 0,
and naturally also ρ2 ≤ r. Further, the distortion and privacy
measures are given as follows:
ρC(x, y) = (x− y)2 (4)
and
ρP (x, y) = − log p(X|Y ) (5)
which results in conditional entropy as the privacy measure
E{ρP (x, y)} = H(X|Y ). The following lemma is a simple
consequence of the fact that the Gaussian distribution max-
imizes entropy subject to covariance constraints (see [11]).
This lemma will be used to convert the equilibrium condi-
tions related to compression and communication problems
to a control theoretic framework (an optimization problem
involving second order statistics).
Lemma 1: At equilibrium, Y,X, θ are jointly Gaussian.
Lemma 1 ensures optimality of a linear decoder and hence
H(θ|Xˆ) = H(θ|Y ) since Xˆ is an invertible function of Y .
Note that invertibility of the decoding mapping, and hence
this simplification in the privacy constraint is a direct conse-
quence of the Stackelberg equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium
variant of the same problem, studied in [1] without a privacy
constraint, does not yield H(θ|Xˆ) = H(θ|Y ), since the
decoding mapping at equilibrium is not invertible (quantizer
based). Lemma 1 and the fact that maximizing H(ξ1|ξ2) is
equivalent to maximizing E{(ξ1 − E{ξ1|ξ2})2} for jointly
Gaussian ξ1, ξ2, enable the following reformulation of Prob-
lem 1:
Problem 2: Find Y = g(X, θ) where g(·, ·) ∈ Γ mini-
mizes
DC = E{(X − E{X|Y })2}
subject to
E{(θ − E{θ|Y })2} ≥ DP
In this paper, we show the existence of such an equilibrium,
and its essential uniqueness 1.
C. Setting-2: Compression
Next, we consider the compression of the source X subject
to privacy constraints, and analyze this problem from an
information theoretic perspective.
Formally, we consider an i.i.d. source Xn and a private
information sequence θn to be compressed to M ≈ 2nR
indices through fE . The receiver applies a decoding function
fD to generate the reconstruction sequence Xˆn. Due to the
strategic aspect of the problem, we have one distortion mea-
sure and one privacy measure. Similar to previous settings,
we assume that the distortion is measured by MSE
DC(fE , fD) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
E{(Xi − Xˆi)2}, (6)
and privacy is measured by conditional entropy.
JP (fE , fD) = H(θ
n|Xˆn) (7)
A triple (R,DC , JP ) is called achievable if for every δ >
0 and sufficiently large n, there exists a block code (fE , fD)
such that
1
n
logM ≤ R+ δ
DC(fE , fD) ≤ DC + δ
JP (fE , fD) ≤ JP + δ .
The set of achievable rate distortion triple (R,DC , JP ) is
denoted here as RD. The following theorem, whose proof
directly follows from the arguments in [8] for a general
distortion measure dC and conditional entropy, characterizes
the achievable region RDS , i.e., converts the problem from
an n−dimensional optimization to a single letter.
Theorem 1: RD is the convex hull of triples (R,DC , JP )
for
R ≥ I(X, θ;Y )
1The optimal transmitter and receiver mappings are not strictly unique, in
the sense that multiple trivially “equivalent” mappings can be used to obtain
the same MSE and privacy costs. For example, the transmitter can apply
any invertible mapping γ(·) to Y and the receiver applies γ−1(γ(Y )) = Y
the prior to h(·). To account for such trivial, essentially identical solutions,
we use the term “essentially unique”.
for a conditional distribution p(Y |X, θ) and a deterministic
decoding function h : R→ R which satisfy
DC ≥ E{dC(X,h(Y ))}
JP ≤ H(θ|Y )
D. Setting-3: Communication over Noisy Channel
Finally, we consider an additive Gaussian noise between
the transmitter and the receiver. This problem setting is
shown in Figure 1, where the receiver observes Y = U +Z,
where Z ∼ N(0, σ2Z) is zero-mean Gaussian and distributed
independent of X and θ. Again, we focus on entropy
based privacy and quadratic distortion measure and Gaussian
variables. The problem can then be reformulated as:
Problem 3: Find U = g(X, θ) that minimize
DC = E{(X − E{X|Y })2}
subject to
E{(θ − E{θ|Y })2} ≥ DP
where Y = U + Z.
III. MAIN RESULTS
A. Simple Equilibrium
Note that Lemma 1 does not provide the exact form of the
function g(·, ·) ∈ Γ, although it implies that Y = X+αθ+S
for some α ∈ R and S ∼ N(0, σ2S) independent of X and
θ. The following observation involves the two extreme cases
of this problem, i.e., the endpoints of the DC-DP curve.
Lemma 2: At maximum privacy, where H(θ|Xˆ) = H(θ),
and at minimum privacy, where H(θ|Xˆ) = H(θ|X), the
equilibrium is achieved at Y = X + αθ for some α ∈ R.
In other words, at end points, there is no need to have the
noise term S.
Proof: At minimum privacy, obviously the optimal
transmitter strategy is Y = X which results in DC = 0.
The only way to achieve maximum privacy, H(θ|Xˆ) =
H(θ), is to render transmitter output Y independent of θ.
Since variables are jointly Gaussian, this can be achieved
by simply transmitting the prediction error, Y = X + αθ
where α = −ρr is MMSE prediction coefficient of X from
θ. After prediction, the privacy constraint is satisfied and
adding noise only increases DC , hence Y = X + αθ is the
optimal transmitter strategy.
In the following, we obtain auxiliary functional properties of
DC and DP as a function of the encoding mapping g(·, ·)
or equivalently fY |X,θ and the DC −DP curve.
Lemma 3: DC and DP are concave functions of fY |X,θ,
and DC(DP ) is an increasing, concave function of DP .
Proof: Let Y (i) be the random variables achieving
DC(f
(i)
Y |X,θ) be characterized by f
(i)
Y |X,θ, and h
(i) for i =
1, 2.
For 0 ≤ c ≤ 1 we define
f cY |X,θ = cf
(1)
Y |X,θ + (1− c)f (2)Y |X,θ.
Then, for any decoding function h(c)(y)
cDC(f
(1)
Y |X,θ) + (1− c)DC(f (2)Y |X,θ)
= c
∫
fX,θ(x, θ)f
(1)
Y |X,θ(x, θ)(x− h(1)(y))2dxdθ
+ (1− c)
∫
fX,θ(x, θ)f
(2)
Y |X,θ(x, θ)(x− h(2)(y))2dxdθ
≤ c
∫
fX,θ(x, θ)f
(1)
Y |X(x, y)(x− h(c)(y))2dxdθ
+ (1− c)
∫
fX,θ(x, θ)f
(2)
Y |X,θ(x, θ)(x− h(c)(y))2dxdθ
=
∫
fX,θ(x, θ)(cf
(1)
Y |X,θ(x, θ) + (1− c)f (2)Y |X,θ(x, θ))
(x− h(c)(y))2dxdθ
=
∫
fX,θ(x, θ)f
c
Y |X,θ(x, θ)(x− h(c)(y))2dxdθ
= DC(cf
(1)
Y |X,θ + (1− c)f (2)Y |X,θ) (8)
which shows the concavity of DC in fY |X,θ. Following
similar steps, we obtain concavity of DP in fY |X,θ, i.e.,
we have
cDP (f
(1)
Y |X,θ) + (1− c)DP (f (2)Y |X,θ) ≤ DP (f cY |X,θ) (9)
Note that DC(DP ) is non-decreasing since DC(DP ) as
expressed in Problem 2, is a minimization over a constraint
set, as DP increases, minimization is performed over a
smaller set, hence DC(DP ) is non-decreasing.
Toward showing concavity of DC(DP ), we first note
that one can show concavity of DC in fθˆ,Y |X,θ where θˆ
is the inspector’s estimate of θ, following similar steps to
the preceding analysis. Then, let Y (i), θˆ(i) be the random
variables achieving DC(D
(i)
P ) be characterized by f
(i)
θˆ,Y |X,θ
for i = 1, 2. We need to show
DC(cD
(1)
P + (1− c)D(2)P ) ≥ cDC(D(1)P ) + (1− c)DC(D(2)P )
(10)
for all 0 ≤ c ≤ 1.
cDC(D
(1)
P ) + (1− c)DC(D(2)P ) =
cDC(f
(1)
θˆ,Y |X,θ) + (1− c)DC(f
(2)
θˆ,Y |X,θ) (11)
≤ DC(cf (1)θˆ,Y |X,θ + (1− c)f
(2)
θˆ,Y |X,θ) (12)
= DC(cD
(1)
P + (1− c)D(2)P ) (13)
where the last step is due to the fact that DP is linear in
fθˆ,Y |X,θ.
Since both privacy and distortions measures are continu-
ous, we only needed to show concavity, since monotonicity
is a consequence of concavity and continuity.
Lemma 2 describes the equilibrium conditions at the end
points. The following theorem provides the exact character-
ization of this equilibrium over the entire DP −DC region.
Theorem 2: For the quadratic Gaussian setting with en-
tropy base privacy constraint, the (essentially) unique equi-
librium is achieved by g(X, θ) = X + αθ and h(Y ) = κY
DC
DP
 min
 max
DPmax
DCmax
DCmin
Fig. 2. DP −DC curve
where α and κ are constants given as:
α =− ρ
r
±
√(
1− ρ
2
r
)(
1
r
− σ
2
X
DP
)
(14)
κ =
1 + αρ
1 + α2r + 2αρ
(15)
Remark 1: An interesting aspect of the solution is that
adding independent noise is strictly suboptimal in achieving
the privacy-distortion trade-off.
Proof: First, we note that the optimal decoder mapping
is
h(Y ) = E{X|Y } (16)
regardless of the choice of encoder’s policy g(·, ·). Hence,
the problem simplifies to an optimization over the encoding
mapping g.
Noting that at equilibrium Y and X, θ are jointly Gaussian,
without loss of generality, we take Y = X + αθ + S where
S ∼ N(0, σ2S) is independent of X and θ. In the following,
we find the value of α and σ2S at equilibrium. First, let us
express DC and DP using standard estimation techniques:
DC(α, σ
2
S) =E{(X − E{X|Y })2} (17)
=σ2X
1− (1 + αρ)2
1 + 2αρ+ α2r +
σ2S
σ2X
 (18)
DP (α, σ
2
S) =E{(θ − E{θ|Y })2} (19)
=σ2X
r − (ρ+ rα)2
1 + 2αρ+ α2r +
σ2S
σ2X
 (20)
Problem 1 can now be converted to an unconstrained [12]
minimization of the Lagrangian cost:
J(α, σ2S) = DC(α, σ
2
S)− λDP (α, σ2S) (21)
for where varying λ ∈ R+ provides solutions at different
levels of privacy constraint DP . A set of necessary conditions
for optimality can be obtained by applying K.K.T. conditions,
one of which is that λ is the slope of the curve:
λ =
dDC(α
∗, σ2∗S )
dDP (α∗, σ2∗S )
(22)
at the optimal values of α and σ2S . Let us expand J(α, σ
2
S)
J(α, σ2S) = σ
2
X(1− λr)− σ2X
 (1 + αρ)2 − λ(ρ+ rα)2
1 + 2αρ+ α2r +
σ2S
σ2X

The value of σ2∗S depends on the sign of Ξ , λ(ρ+ rα)2 −
(1 +αρ)2, i.e., if Ξ ≥ 0, then σ2∗S = 0. In the following, we
show that Ξ ≥ 0 for all α ∈ [−ρr , 0], and hence σ2∗S = 0.
First, we note that the minimum value of λ is reached at
the maximum allowed DP , as depicted in Figure 2. From
Lemma 2 for DP = DPmax , the solution implies that σ
2∗
S =
0. Hence, Ξ ≥ 0 at DP = DPmax . Plugging the values, we
obtain λ ≥ 0. Following similar steps for DP = DPmin , we
obtain λ ≤ 1ρ2 . For λ ∈ [0, 1ρ2 ] and α ∈ [−ρr , 0], we have
Ξ ,(1 + αρ)2 − λ(ρ+ α)2
≥(1 + αρ)2 − 1
ρ2
(ρ+ α)2
=2α(ρ− r
ρ
) + α2(ρ2 − r
2
ρ2
)
=α(ρ− r
ρ
)(2 + α(ρ+
r
ρ
)). (23)
Note that from Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we have r ≥ ρ2
and noting that −ρr ≥ α ≥ 0, we conclude Ξ ≥ 0. Hence,
σ2∗S = 0 for all values of DP . Toward obtaining α
∗, plug
σ2N = 0 into (20), to obtain:(
1− r − ρ
2
DP /σ2X
)
+ 2αρ+ α2r = 0.
The solution to this second order equation is simply
α∗ = −ρ
r
±
√(
1− ρ
2
r
)(
1
r
− σ
2
X
DP
)
(24)
Both of these solutions (corresponding to ±) satisfy the pri-
vacy constraint with equality, and the following one achieves
lower DC , and hence is the optimal solution:
α∗ = −ρ
r
+
√(
1− ρ
2
r
)(
1
r
− σ
2
X
DP
)
(25)
The optimal decoding mapping is
h(Y ) = E{X|Y } = 1 + αρ
1 + rα2 + 2αρ
Y. (26)
B. Problem-2
Next, we consider compression of jointly Gaussian source-
private information with entropy based privacy measure and
MSE distortion. First, we observe that all equilibrium points
are achieved by a jointly Gaussian X, θ, Y and hence Y can
be written as Y = X + αθ + N for some α ∈ R, and
N ∼ N(0, σ2N ) is Gaussian and independent of X and θ.
The proof of this statement follows from the well-known
property of Gaussian distribution achieving maximum en-
tropy under a variance constraint and the steps in the proof
of Theorem 1. Hence, the test channel achieving the rate-
distortion function adds independent Gaussian noise (forward
test channel interpretation of Gaussian rate distortion also
holds in this privacy constrained setting). Note that the
privacy constraint is always active in the simple equilibrium
setting, and the equilibrium is at the boundary of the con-
straint set, i.e., we find optimal α by setting the privacy
constraint equality. In the compression case, compression
itself provides some level privacy inherently (it is evident
from the forward channel interpretation of the RD function).
Hence, the privacy constraint may not be active in the com-
pression case, which yields α∗ = 0. The following theorem
characterizes the optimal rate-distortion-privacy trade-off.
Theorem 3: For a given DP , the space of R−DC is given
as
R = log
(
1 +
σ2X
σ2N
(1 + α2r + 2αρ)
)
(27)
DC =σ
2
X
1− (1 + αρ)2
1 + 2αρ+ α2r +
σ2N
σ2X
 (28)
where
α = −ρ
r
+ Φ, (29)
and
Φ = min
√√√√(1− ρ2
r
)(
1
r
− 1
DP
σ2X
(1 + σ2N )− rσ2N
)
,
ρ
r

as a function of σ2N .
Proof: We have Y = X+βθ+N for some α ∈ R where
N is zero-mean Gaussian with variance σ2N and independent
of X and θ. This representation yields, by standard estima-
tion theoretic techniques, the following characterization of
R,DC , DP in terms of σ2N :
R =
1
2
log
(
1 +
σ2X
σ2N
(1 + α2r + 2αρ)
)
(30)
DC = σ
2
X
 α2(r − ρ2) + σ2Nσ2X
1 + 2αρ+ α2r +
σ2N
σ2X
 (31)
DP = σ
2
X
r − (ρ+ rα)2
1 + 2αρ+ α2r +
σ2N
σ2X
 (32)
Following steps similar to the ones in the proof of Theo-
rem 2, we can express α∗ in terms of DP , when the privacy
constraint is active, as:
α∗ = −ρ
r
±
√√√√(1− ρ2
r
)(
1
r
− 1
DP
σ2X
(1 + σ′2N )− rσ2N
)
.
Form these solutions, the following achieves a lower value
for DC :
α∗ = −ρ
r
+
√√√√(1− ρ2
r
)(
1
r
− 1
DP
σ2X
(1 + σ′2N )− rσ2N
)
.
When the privacy constraint is already satisfied, α∗ = 0.
C. Problem-3
We next focus on noisy communication settings, i.e., we
assume there is an additive white Gaussian noise Z ∼
N(0, σ2Z) as shown in Figure 2. The following theorem
provides the encoding and decoding mappings at the equili-
birum.
Theorem 4: For the quadratic Gaussian communication
setting with entropy based privacy constraint, the (essen-
tially) unique equilibrium is achieved by
U =
√
PT
σ2X(1 + 2αρ+ α
2r)
(X + αθ)
and h(Y ) = κY where α and κ are constants given as:
κ =
1 + αρ
1 + α2r + 2αρ
(33)
and
α = −ρ
r
+ Φ, (34)
and
Φ = min
√√√√(1− ρ2
r
)(
1
r
− 1
DP
σ2X
(1 + σ2N )− rσ2N
)
,
ρ
r

Proof: First, we observe that linear mappings are
optimal, due to the well-known optimality of linear mappings
(without the privacy constraint) [13], and the fact that jointly
Gaussian U,X, θ maximizes H(θ|Y ) with fixed second-order
statistics. Next, we assume without any loss of generality,
that Y = β(X + αθ) + N for some β ∈ R+ and α ∈ R.
Then, we have
E{XY } = βσ2X(1 + αρ), E{θY } = βσ2X(ρ+ rα)
E{Y 2} = β2σ2X(1 + 2αρ+ rα2) + σ2N
Hence,
DP =σ
2
X
r − (ρ+ rα)2
1 + 2αρ+ α2r +
σ2N
β2σ2X
 (35)
DC =σ
2
X
1− (1 + αρ)2
1 + 2αρ+ α2r +
σ2N
β2σ2X
 (36)
Note that since PT = E{U2} = β2σ2X(1 + 2αρ+ α2r), we
can re-express DP as
DP =σ
2
X
(
r − β
2σ2X(ρ+ rα)
2
PT + σ2N
)
(37)
=σ2X
(
r − (ρ+ rα)
2
1 + 2αρ+ α2r
PT
PT + σ2N
)
(38)
=σ2X
(
σ2N
PT + σ2N
r +
r − ρ2
1 + 2αρ+ α2r
PT
PT + σ2N
)
(39)
Note that the power constraint is always active, and when
the privacy constraint is active, we have:
α∗= −ρ
r
±
√√√√(1− ρ2
r
)(
1
r
− 1
DP
σ2X
(1+σ2N/PT )−rσ2N/PT
)
.
From these solutions, the following achieves a lower DC :
α∗=−ρ
r
+
√√√√(1− ρ2
r
)(
1
r
− 1
DP
σ2X
(1+σ2N/PT )−rσ2N/PT
)
.
When the privacy constraint is already satisfied, α∗ = 0.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have addressed some fundamental prob-
lems associated with strategic communication in the presence
of privacy constraints. Although the compression and com-
munication problems are inherently information theoretic, for
entropy based privacy measure, MSE distortion and jointly
Gaussian source and private information, the problem admits
a control theoretic representation (optimization over second
order statistics). We have explicitly characterized the equilib-
rium conditions for compression and communication under
privacy constraints. Rather surprisingly, the simple equilib-
rium solution (without compression) does not require addi-
tion of independent noise to satisfy the privacy constraints,
as opposed to the common folklore in such problems. Some
future directions include using results presented in this paper
for decentralized stochastic control problems (see [14]) with
privacy constraints, extending the approach to vector and
network settings, and finally investigating implications in
economics.
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